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The analyst’s task is to account for [the] “lived” quality . . . to show how actors deal 
with this alliance between the rational and the pulsional . . . for it always says more than 
the intentional signs of  the character (Pavis 2003, 136).
Performers of text, even those working with short pieces of  script at a time (as is the way with 
filmed performance) repeat memorised words many times, often with the objective to sound each 
time as if  the words just happened to come to them in that instant, in response to the need to express 
a specific thought. I propose that when this is successfully achieved, particularly in the erformance of  
Shakespearean text without losing the heightened, poetic nature of  the text, the illusion of  ‘natural’ 
speech which is described as ‘being in the moment’ owes its existence to a particular meta-performa-
tive quality adhering in the voice.
Introduction
The first challenge when discussing anything as ephemeral as the voice in performance is finding 
a method of  capturing its unique quality without turning it into something else, or killing it stone 
dead, since by its very nature it only ever occurs once. In an attempt to reveal, rather than capture 
something of  that uniqueness, the concept of  performative speech acts has been appropriated to pro-
vide a framework which nevertheless relates directly to the physical nature of  the voiced text as it is 
delivered and perceived. The second challenge is to find an appropriate vocabulary relevant to sound, 
rather than to vision, since the language of  visual metaphors has been the convention for discussing 
matters relating to perception since at least the time of  the ancient Greeks (Ihde 1972, 5). This paper 
therefore considers the text spoken in performance as a series of  interrelated and indivisible tempo-
ral events (Cresswell 1996, 79-88), each vocal event resonating (both physically and metaphorically) 
with perceptible qualities. Without delving too deeply into event theory, such a phenomenological 
approach allows the voice which executes the vocal event to be discussed in terms of  its influences, its 
circumstances and its effect, to some extent, upon the listener.
The process of  discussing the vocal event, especially with regard to performance, is necessarily sub-
jective. There may be an entity identifiable as the vocal performance within the performance text, but 
it exists only as a relationship between its eventuation and its perceivers. As an individual who brings 
to the process of  perception a set of  values, belief  systems and a personal psychological state which
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cannot help but impinge upon, and influence in some way, the resulting argument, I acknowledge 
that there is no “neutral” stance from which an objective Cartesian “vision” can be abstracted (Ihde 
1972, 41). Nevertheless, such is the tradition of  writing about performance in the western world from 
a presumed objective stance that it is important to acknowledge the non-objective phenomenological 
stance I undertake in this paper.
Voice
The voiced utterance, like any other temporal event, is influenced by preceding and contiguous events, 
and therefore the words may be spoken in a range of  different ways, depending on the circumstances. 
For example, the speaker may inflect the voice ironically in such a way that the listener is made 
aware that the core speech act of  the language has been compromised. This level of  performativity, 
with all its inherent ambivalences, is what is expected of  a naturalistic performance, particularly one 
associated with so-called ‘method’ acting, and with contemporary texts. I suggest that in these circum-
stances what we actually hear in performance is an aural illusion of  the normal, or ‘natural’ vocal 
event. When the language is heightened, poetic or verse drama, such as Shakespeare, the illusion is 
still possible, although its success is also dependent on the skill level of  the performer in the use of  
such structured text.
All spoken utterances are, by definition, voiced. The voice is created within the body of  the speaker, 
and that body is a uniquely complex combination of  matter, solids and fluids, constantly in motion. 
The responsive voice is influenced from moment to moment by chemical reactions resulting from the 
mental and emotional state of  the speaker, and the speaker’s environment (Damasio 1994, 138-42). 
Pavis states that “[w]estern actors are trained to change their voices continually, according to the 
person they are addressing” (2003, 138). They are trained to do it, because they are mostly unaware 
that in ‘real life’, they do this all the time. Vocal quality is adjusted instinctively when talking to small 
children, to computers, or to our mothers, for example (Armstrong). As well as this phenomenon, 
cultural, social and familial circumstances influence the way utterances are voiced and perceived, and 
these may not be, “under sovereign control” (Butler 1990, 69 in Worthen 1998, 1098).
Words are audible thought, and thoughts do not exist separate from the body—the ‘being’—of  
the self  who generates them (Damasio 1994, 240). The body transforms them into sound, the ever 
moving, changing thoughts compel movement and transformation in the body and sound emerges 
in transformation even as the body prepares for the following sounds. A single vocal event may be 
defined in terms of  phrase or sentence structure, but it is experienced by voicer and listener alike as a 
flowing, continuous “stream” (Handel 1989, 189) in a constant state of  flux (Ihde 1972, 84).
The speaker’s voice shaped into words is the nearest thing possible in that instant, (arguably the identi-
cal) thing to the self  as constituted in that moment, the unique “vocalic revelation” (Cavarero 2005, 
11), of  the speaker. The vocal event manifests the thoughts, the ‘being’ of  the speaker, with all of  the 
contradictions and inconsistencies that involves. The speaker who says one thing and means another 
is perceived as insincere. The speaker who says one thing, and means it as she says it, may be acting, 
(otherwise known as lying), but she will be heard as genuine. The listener perceives the sound and 
interprets within her own cultural and social conventions the meanings of  the words, the functionally 
performative expressions within the phrases and the para-linguistic tonal qualities including inflec-
tions and intonations; however the interpretation is also subject to the para-performative or meta-
performative qualities which are evident within the sound.1
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Performativity
J. L. Austin, who coined the term ‘performative speech acts’ considers that the words of  a written 
text, when spoken in performance, are “hollow or void . . . in some ways parasitic upon [language’s] 
normal use” (Austin in Rottenberg 1997, 566 original emphasis). It is my contention that, far from 
being “hollow or void”, language spoken in performance retains its innate functionality, however this 
may be inadvertently suppressed to a greater or lesser degree, or revealed in unexpected ways. When 
suppressed, the flow of  vocal events is often perceived as ‘muddy’, or lacking in clarity; however, when 
potentialities within the language are revealed via what States refers to as an “unfamiliar route” (1985, 
22), the effect is likely to be recognisable as ‘being in the moment’. This latter quality is what Bogart 
refers to when he observes, of  Spencer Tracy:
Spencer does it, that’s all. Feels it. Says it. Talks. Listens. He means what he says when he 
says it, and if  you think that’s easy, try it (Humphrey Bogart in Hall 1983, 6).
Linguistic performativity is inherent in the language provided by the playwright for the character in 
the play, to be used as if  it were in normal use, in the world inhabited by the character. In that world, 
the words of  the text may have an active (Austinian) performativity, performing an action or deed in 
their own right such as ‘promising’ or ‘asserting’. For the most part, individual speech acts exist in 
isolation only in theory. In the moment of  utterance, as the vocal event occurs, they have a habit of  
being rendered less efficacious or even contradicted by what Austin refers to as “infelicities” (Austin 
1970). For example, the speaker may be distracted, confused or ignorant of  the appropriate linguistic 
convention for the particular occasion, and so the effective performance of  the intended function 
(for example ‘to forgive’ as in “I forgive you”) is compromised. Just as words retain their literal mean-
ing, even though that literal meaning may be subverted in the execution of  a vocal event (Stainton 
2007, 10), the performative function of  the language used, arguably, loses its illocutionary force while 
retaining its performative potential. It is not relevant to my argument to pursue this in terms of  either 
linguistics or semantic theory, two disciplines of  which my knowledge is limited. Rather, I wish to ex-
plore the spoken text’s performative qualities as being aspects of  the performer’s vocal aesthetic.
Para-Performativity
A second level of  performativity occurs as part of  the vocal event when the utterance takes the form 
of  a demonstration which has nothing to do with the world of  the play, or the character’s inten-
tions. For example the voice, in the execution of  the vocal event, may be used to impose a particular 
meaning the performer deems essential to the audience’s understanding. Merleau-Ponty refers to 
this imposition of  meaning as the “mere ‘fulfilment’ of  a sign (1970, xiv). Alternatively, the event 
may take the form of  a vocal citation, foregrounding the fact that authorship of  the script does not 
lie with the speaker; or the event may have a ‘quotational’ quality, whereby the listener is reminded 
that the words have been memorised, or that a particular style of  delivery has been selected, and now 
consciously determines how the text is presented. In some instances, delivery of  specific lines results 
from pre-ordained decisions, inhibiting the actors’ ability to: “deliberately allow[ing] their corporeal-
ity to ‘overflow’ and impact” (Pavis 2003, 136) in unexpected, presently occurring ways. When this oc-
curs in performance, the vocal aesthetic is often perceived as an ‘acting’ voice. In all of  these instances, 
the secondary performative function is superimposed over the first, with varying degrees of  aurally 
perceptible transparency. I shall refer to this act of  superimposition as para-performativity: ‘para’ in 
the sense of  providing a cover or protection (as in parachute), and also ‘para’ because it is—in Austin’s 
usage—“parasitic upon [language’s] normal use”. This is not intended as a derogatory appellation, 
rather it is intended to be descriptive.
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We do not hear at only one level . . . it is not that we hear words but not phonemes, or 
phonemes but not formants, or formants but not transients. Rather, we can listen at all 
levels . . . Sometimes each level illustrates only one facet of  an event; other times each 
level illustrates a different reality. Possibly the question “What do we hear?” is a poor one, 
because it suggests one answer to a reality that admits many (Handel 1989, 181).
As Handel suggests, individual sounds (phonemes) and words are heard without necessarily being 
registered as such. Indeed when they are, the attention which is directed to identifying such segmented 
events is attention which has been subtracted (or distracted) from the wider context of  the ongoing 
series of  vocal events (Handel 1989, 189-90). Likewise, the act of  demonstrating, citing or quoting, is 
capable of  diverting the listener’s attention from the innate linguistic codes of  performativity which 
reside within the language by drawing attention to the duality, if  not the artificiality of  the situation. 
There are occasions when it is appropriate, and creative, for a performer to direct focus to this duality, 
or artificiality, however I shall argue that this can be achieved as a stylistic device without diminishing 
the functional performativity within the language by a process of  integration, outlined below, rather 
than one of  superimposition.
The performer’s contract with an audience involves the acceptance by both parties that, as Worthen 
puts it: “[p]erforming reconstitutes the text” (1998, 1097). It is not necessary, in most cases of  the 
performance of  dramatic text, for a performer to sign-post that the words are not hers; when this 
happens, consciously intended or not, the text sounds as if  it is being quoted, as against being ex-
pressed. There is a school of  thought that considers this to be a ‘Brechtian’ style of  performance, and 
it certainly can have a distancing, or dislocating effect upon the listener. However, Brecht’s descrip-
tion of  Helene Weigel’s voice as “wholly unemotional and penetrating” when announcing Jocasta’s 
death does not imply that she was either demonstrating the meaning, or quoting the text. Indeed, he 
goes on to state that while she did not “abandon her voice to horror”; she spoke “firmly and defi-
nitely”, relating the events in a highly idiocyncratic, unexpected manner in which, in Brecht’s words, 
“there was no mistaking her tone”, whether it was one of  astonishment, self-pity or a denial of  regret 
(in Willett 1964, 28). States makes the point that “revolutions like Brecht’s are not unconnected to 
Shklovsky’s idea that “art makes objects ‘unfamiliar’” (1985, 24). I would argue that Brecht’s quest for 
the performance which provokes and stimulates an audience into utilising its own imagination and its 
critical faculties has more to do with Shklovskian artistry than with para-performativity. The ‘art’ is 
the result of  craft applied in such a way as to conceal the craft, and reveal the object—in the case of  
performance, language with all its inherent and unfamiliar possibilities.
Meta-Performativity
Such a level of  artistry is present with the occurrence of  a higher, or ‘meta’ level of  performativity, 
when the practical requirements of  performance, such as appropriate volume, extended range and 
clarity, and remembered lines are all present and accommodated, but integrated with or transformed 
into the context of  the moment. Meta-performativity (‘meta’ in the sense of  “[d]enoting change, 
transformation, permutation, or substitution” (O.E.D. online) allows for thought, voice and words to 
be, as far as discernible, ‘as one’, having been absorbed by the actor as the expression of  presently 
occurring thought processes. This is unremarkable in everyday speech; but it needs to be consciously 
facilitated and practised by the actor (Rodenburg 1993, 4). Meta-performativity involves the act of  
appropriation of  the words of  the text as they are uttered, in order that their linguistic and performa-
tive codes may be revealed by the vocal event, with all the complexity, subtlety and potential instability 
that implies. I suggest that when the latter occurs, what is perceived by the audience is what is per-
ceived by the audience is what is identified as ‘being in the moment’. This is the vocal quality which
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creates the illusion of  ‘natural’ or ‘real’ speech, as against ‘acted’ speech.
Performativity in the context of  performance requires the physical presence of  the ‘act-or’, the person 
undertaking the act; therefore performative implies—literally— ‘being there’. Performance, in the 
present sense of  performing a memorised text, requires that the actor ‘be there’ for the purpose of  
creating the illusion of  the character’s ‘being there’. When the skilled, rehearsed actor is aware of, and 
responsive to the physical, mental and emotional states which continuously transform her being in 
performance, the verbal expression she requires comes in the shape of  the words the playwright has 
provided, and the meta-performative act is that of  ‘being there’. It is the constantly renewing action 
of  this process which allows her to be totally present, on stage, in character, speaking ‘as if ’ she were 
the embodiment of  her character—which is what, in fact, she is. Everyday speech, which cannot help 
but be ‘in the moment’ is described by Cavarero as “not simply the verbal sphere of  expression: it 
is also the point of  tension between the uniqueness of  the voice and the system of  language” (2005, 
14). When the performing voice is in relation to the system of  language provided by the playwright, 
the point of  tension is what the listener perceives as ‘liveness’, or ‘being in the moment’. There is an 
aural illusion, or an illusory perception that the words are those of  the speaker who is identified as the 
character rather than the actor, and the meta-performative action of  ‘being’ has been accomplished. 
It is not merely an illusion, or an abstract metaphysical event: in that moment, those words are the 
words of  the person speaking them.
When dealing with a highly structured, poetic textual style, the performer needs to have the vocal and 
linguistic skill to speak as if  it were natural for her to speak in that style (Cohen 1978, 147-53). This 
does not equate to speaking ‘naturalistically’, if  by that is meant in a localised contemporary style. 
What is at issue here is the ability of  the performer to express herself  by means of  the vocabulary, 
phraseology, style of  expression, linguistic and literary structure as if  they were ‘normal’ to her. Rather 
than transforming the text to meet the criteria and conventions of  her own ‘normal’ (that is, contem-
porary) use of  language, she must have the skill to give the impression that the criteria and conventions 
which are ‘normal’ to the character are normal to her. Shakespearean performance which recites, or 
demonstrates with para-performative efficiency is fairly easily identified as “the Shakespeare Voice”.
Hamlet
In my research to date, I have undertaken two case studies, in which I have identified both para-
performativity and meta-performativity within productions of  Shakespearean performances (studied 
on video). Richard Roxburgh as Hamlet in Company B’s 1992 production, directed by Neil Armfield, 
is consistently ‘in the moment’. He expresses himself  in Shakespeare’s heightened prose and poetry 
as if  there were no other way to speak. Yet this alone is not sufficient to engage and then keep my 
attention without a conscious effort on my part to continually ‘suspend my disbelief ’ throughout the 
duration of  the performance. Beyond this considerable expertise in the use of  the language, the meta-
performative quality within the sound of  his voice has the effect of  opening an aural gateway to the 
thoughts of  the speaker, and the consistent presence of  that quality allows for an intense theatrical 
experience within the world of  the play.
Clearly, I express myself  subjectively in the two preceding paragraphs, since, as stated in my intro-
duction, there is no way I can distance myself  from my experience, any more than I am capable 
of  taking a viewpoint which is other than anthropocentric (Matthen 2005, 153). Any attempt to 
so distance myself  can only be from within the context of  my experience and my understanding. 
In Heideggerian terms, my understanding of  the vocal event/s manifested as part of  Roxburgh’s 
performance of  Hamlet is “conditioned by a prior concern for the subject matter and [that] any 
understanding is the result of  an inevitably circular process of  interpretation” (Hoy 1980, 895).
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For example, when Hamlet says to Rosencrantz and Guildenstern: ”I will tell you why; so shall my 
anticipation / prevent your discovery of  your secrecy to the King and / Queen” (II, ii. 1340-42) it 
is within the narrative framework which includes, at this stage in the play, his distress at his father’s 
death, his belief  in the King’s guilt and suspicion of  the Queen’s duplicity, and his sense of  betrayal 
by his former companions. These factors provide background information as to why Roxburgh/
Hamlet’s voice at this moment in the play resonates as balancing delicately somewhere between sar-
casm and warmth, two qualities dependent upon tonal and intellectual control.. They do not, howev-
er, provide adequate explanation as to why I also feel both shock and admiration for Hamlet, and not, 
you will note, for Roxburgh (that comes later, on reflection). The speech act (asserting a commitment 
to admit why he is behaving so strangely) contained in the text is revealed, along with its potential for 
being a lie. There is no hint of  lines remembered or quoted, there is only the effect (apparently on 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern and certainly on me) that I am hearing a genuine commitment. This 
has the effect of  comforting Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, and of  shocking me, since I don’t want 
Hamlet to tell them the truth. I know in advance what comes next, and yet I am still shocked.
A description, emanating from the ‘global’ experience (Ihde 1972, 44), depends upon the way the 
listener (myself) attends to the event, whether focusing my attention narrowly upon smaller and 
smaller events until the sounds emerge as individual words or phonemes, or broadening it out to 
encompass the “flux and flow” of  the sound world (Ihde 1972, 84). Sitting in the office of  the Belvoir 
Street Theatre’s wardrobe department and watching the performance on an elderly television set from 
an elderly video recording, it is not possible to completely forget one’s surroundings. Yet something in 
the moments captured electronically and relayed to me contains my attention within a span just wide 
enough and deep enough to encompass Hamlet and the two courtiers, to recognise what Hamlet is 
saying (having seen the play before, and read it many times), to comprehend, from my perspective, the 
political motivation which brings him to say it, and to be genuinely surprised at how he says it. Within 
that ‘how’, it is possible to set down in phonetic notation the pronunciation of  each word, the stress 
values, the rhythm and the intonation patterns of  the lines. From that notation it would be possible 
for anyone conversant with phonetic notation to speak the lines with exactly the same pronunciation, 
stress, rhythm and intonation, and yet still fail to capture the particular vocal quality which occurred 
in the vocal event as I experienced it. A skilful performer can re-constitute Roxburgh’s interpreta-
tion with full value given to the linguistic performativity, or as a quotational event by mimicking his 
inflections and intonation; and while it may be possible to actually provide the meta-performative 
quality which made it thrilling in the first place, it is difficult enough to engage with language meta-
performatively from a remembered sequence of  words, let alone a remembered sequence of  words, 
stresses and rhythmic and intonation patterns, and range of  vocal qualities. It is far simpler, and more 
reliable to engage with the text on one’s own terms, than to try to do so on someone else’s terms. This 
is why students need to be discouraged from basing their performance on the performance of  another 
actor.
Macbeth
Another example comes from Edwin Hodgeman in the title role of  the State Theatre of  South 
Australia’s 1977 production of  Macbeth, directed by Colin George. Never less than intelligently pre-
sented, there are times when the para-performativity in his vocal sound is that of  an actor play-
ing, or demonstrating Shakespeare’s Macbeth, at others it is not apparent, and his voice seems to 
become (or comes to be) the voice of  Macbeth—or to put it another way, the vocal event/s oc-
cur as the expression of  the character. The para-performative process of  remembering lines and 
demonstrating his understand-ing of  them is subsumed within the performative function of  the 
language, and the transformation both clarifies the language and reveals complexities within it.
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Throughout this production, Macbeth’s progress from ambitious, loving husband to tyrannical and 
insensitive warlord can be charted vocally in terms of  resonant quality from an open but guarded 
quality in the early scenes to the edgy, sharply constrained voice with which he responds to Macduff ’s 
challenge in the later battle: “But get thee back! My soul is too much charged/With blood of  thine 
already” (V, vi. 5-6). In Hodgeman’s interpretation, over-weening confidence at this point allows an 
almost conversational note in his voice: it is relaxed, broadly resonant. This is in sharp contrast to the 
way these lines are more often delivered: this is the moment when Macbeth usually expresses regret 
at his actions.2 Indeed, the speech act contained in the language is that of  confessing, and the phrase 
“too much charged” implies there is something Macbeth would rather were not so; in other words, 
Shakespeare has apparently written an apology, if  a grudging one. Yet, in this instance, this Macbeth 
is not apologetic, even in the very act of  apologising. The words make sense, the speech act of  apolo-
gising is clearly performed, yet the sequence of  vocal events fall upon my ears as an expression of  
extreme arrogance, and I feel a deep dread at the recognition of  the existence of  such arrogance in 
the world as I know it. The vocal events I experience are particular to the life and circumstances of  
the world of  Macbeth at that moment. As with the Hamlet example above, there is no notation which 
even can adequately account for the vocal quality which is perceptible at such times; it is in addition 
to the resonant quality and yet inseparable from it also. It is the quality of  meta-performativity. It is a 
quality which, in the instant of  eventuation, transforms the language from text, or even from spoken 
words, into art, in that it is the “setting-into-work of  truth” (Heidegger 1971, 73).
It may be possible that both para- and meta-performativity, as described above, could be described 
as para-linguistic suprasegmentals, being vocal effects which articipate in the process of  communica-
tion, in a category similar to tone or intonation. I would argue however that there is a strong case for 
considering them as aspects of  vocal aesthetics, indivisible from the integral being of  the performer, 
rather than as aspects of  the language itself. There is clearly a need for further research which takes 
these qualities of  para-performativity and meta-performativity into account when identifying the 
processes of  meaning-making in the theatre, as they relate to the performer engaged in the practice 
of  making theatre, and to the audience in the act of  experiencing theatre. In the performance of
 Shakespeare in particular, the concept of  meta-performativity offers a means of  analysing 
performance after the event, while providing students with a means of  identifying the results of  
different approaches to the performance of  text.
________________________
Notes
1. Of  course, visual input also influences how the sound is perceived. It is not my intention to deny or to 
negate such influences, but rather to reinforce acknowledgement of  the contribution made by sound, and in 
particular the sound of  the voice uttering text. 
2. Thanks to Richard Fotheringham for this observation.
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